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THE COMMONWEAL

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, LITERATURE AND THE ARTS

Party Re-Alignment?

THOSE WHO demand ideological political parties in the United States are generally not professional politicians. This is true of Wendell Willkie, who suggested conservative and liberal parties in the early Forties, and it is true of Barry Goldwater who suggests the same thing today. The idea is essentially nostalgic. It rarely afflicts the practicing politicians who are devoted to building majorities and hammering out compromises. Neither Willkie nor Goldwater has ever been a part of this process. They are free to ruminate because their careers have never been besmirched by any experience of how the American political process really works.

Even so, Senator Goldwater does not seem to wonder how a Goldwater-style ideological party would ever come up with 51 per cent of the vote. Would it retain ideological purity regardless of what the voters want, as the Republican Party did this year, or would it try to build a winning combination by blurring ideological lines and appealing to the center? If the latter, which is more probable, the Senator's conservative Party would shortly come to look quite like the pre-Goldwater G.O.P—a party of a certain conservative and pro-business tendency, but not dedicated to abstract mental purity. The American commitment to the two-party system, in other words, is a national charter against ideological parties.

The blurring of ideological issues is the price we pay for a stable two-party system. It is a price almost all of us pay willingly, and the fruit it brings is moderation. A party that ranges from James Eastland to Wayne Morse, or from Barry Goldwater to Jacob Javits is not often captured by extremists. And in the clash of forces at Presidential conventions, its nominees are virtually always men of the center.

The Republican convention in San Francisco produced one of the rare breakdowns of the system. The breakdown should be self-corrective—a party as thoroughly beaten as the G.O.P., by all the normal rules, moves where the majorities roam, and that is at the center. The move is usually automatic, presided over mechanically by party professionals.

THERE is evidence that despite Goldwater this process is already under way. In the so-called Goldwater country of the mountain states and the far west, several Republican state organizations are reported ready to return to the fold. In many states the Goldwaterites never completely took over. Since their number includes Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and New York, the chances for another Goldwater nomination, or even for a campaign slightly resembling Goldwater's, must be accounted slim. Though some Goldwaterites in national and state posts are digging in, the unrelieved Republican disaster of November 3, on all levels of government, leaves them with little leverage and no talking point. Even some of the Goldwaterites are leery of rallying around the fallen leader. One of New York State's leading Goldwaterites said on TV recently that conservativs cannot win with a nomineee who runs a campaign as stupidly as Barry did. Presumably even he did not want Barry in 1968. From this point of view, the nation is fortunate that the Goldwater movement has no other national figure to rally around. Whatever his feelings about keeping the party to the right, Goldwater may yet have to turn over the troops to a Nixon-type centrist.

The rest of the Republican Party seems to have the same idea in mind. Having dismissed Rockefeller in his usual graceless post-election speech, Richard Nixon will now have to talk with the governor, and every other Republican left standing. Scranton, whose repugnant speeches in support of Goldwater were the price of staying alive as a candidate for 1968, will carry some weight, perhaps more than he should. Everett Dirksen, a twentieth-century conservative who can speak to both the

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Goldwaterites and the moderates, can play the honest broker. The only disquieting note to date, aside from the absence of a commanding party leader, is the attempt to slough off the bright young moderates in the House who clearly represent the Party's future, men like Lindsay, Laird and Ford. To ignore them is to invite a future wave of Goldwaterism.

Defenses and Security

THIS COUNTRY'S defense planning is anything but static. New military accords signed with West Germany call for a variety of joint military activities that could increase NATO's potential materially. Envisaged are: development of a new lightweight fighter plane and of a tank that will represent a "quantum" advance in proficiency; equipment of American forces with a superior twenty millimeter automatic gun and of German forces with the latest helicopters and three American missile-equipped destroyers; an active exchange between German and American military technicians and, in general, of research on defense. At the same time the British Institute of Strategic Studies has just disclosed that the Soviet Union has greatly increased the strength of its forces in Europe through the most advanced mobile equipment—both for conventional and tactical-nuclear warfare.

Additional evidence on the arms race is found in the Institute's figures on intercontinental missiles and Polaris nuclear weapons. Both America and the Soviet Union have twice as many ICBM's as they had a year ago, while this country has greatly widened its margin in Polaris superiority.

Closer German-American cooperation on defense and the rise of the ratio in intercontinental overkill to more than four to one in America's favor may be quite reassuring to some. But we wonder whether progress in another direction would not be more meaningful for national security and world peace. We refer to new efforts to build on the test-ban treaty.

One effort is to prevail upon the thermonuclear nations to halt further proliferation by withholding the necessary knowledge and materials from others and by persuading aspirants to membership in the atomic club to drop their nuclear programs. Another, proposed by a Soviet and an American scientist, proposes the Arctic as nuclear-free area for developing mutual inspection techniques which later could gradually be extended to more strategic areas. Finally, the opening of the large-scale, Rowe, Mass., nuclear power plant to Yugoslav, Swedish and Japanese technicians is demonstrating that international inspection can determine whether any of such a plant's output has been diverted to weapons. Clearly, deceleration and progress in controls and disarmament offer a better guarantee of national and world security than the current arms race.

Multi-Lateral Force

THE UNITED STATES' latest effort to strengthen NATO follows the logic of the hospital aide who insisted he'd make the patient take her medicine—even if it killed her. As a device for unifying NATO the U.S. has proposed a multilateral nuclear fleet (MLF) of 25 disguised merchant ships carrying Polaris missiles armed with nuclear warheads to be manned and controlled by NATO members.

The MLF idea has been around a long time; it originated in the dying days of the Eisenhower administration as an alternative to installing missiles in Germany to counter the medium-range missiles the Soviets had placed on their western border. The perfection of intercontinental missiles undercut this military rationale for MLF, but the "rationale gap" was short-lived. French strategists were suggesting that the Russians' new ability to strike at the U.S. directly meant that America might not stand up to a Soviet move against Western Europe or, at most, would be willing to risk a limited war, fighting it out with the Soviets on European soil. To prevent this awful possibility, the French insisted on the need for an independent nuclear force to assure the Russians that any attack on Western Europe would endanger Russian cities. To the U.S. this French strategy looked dangerous, threatening with its spirit of "independence" to tear apart NATO and to encourage the spread of nuclear arms. MLF now had a political rather than a military role to play: to "clamp the alliance together" according to Dean Rusk, to demonstrate America's commitment to the defense of Europe (and not on European soil), and thus to divert European energies from constructing independent deterrents.

These political ends have their merits; but MLF as a means has none. It simply creates more problems than it solves. Militarily, of course, it is a freak; and even the American officers who have endorsed the multi-national (hence, multi-lingual) fleet state merely that the project is "feasible." But the political complications are worse. Proposed as a means of tightening NATO, MLF is opposed by virtually every NATO member except the U.S. and West Germany—and West Germany has its doubts. France's hinted withdrawal from NATO if MLF goes through is unlikely; but there are lesser forms of disruption than withdrawal. The Soviets have warned that MLF means eventual German control

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of nuclear weapons, an absolutely intolerable situation from their point of view (and not only theirs). At present, the U.S. would have a veto over the use of MLF nuclear warheads, but statements by President Johnson and Dean Rusk on possible future revision of the fleet's command structure have been ambiguous. German Defense Minister von Hassel has spoken of a future moment when it will be possible "to persuade the American partner to give up his veto and establish majority rule for the political and military use of this force."

Britain has suggested modifications of the multilateral force which present complications of their own; but perhaps the British proposals will provide the U.S. with an opportunity to abandon the present concept and search for some other to the very real problems of NATO. At present, however, the State Department is showing only a lemming-like determination to pursue its multilateral folly.

James O'Gara is in Rome. His column, "All Things Considered," will appear again shortly.

WASHINGTON REPORT

Consolidating Democratic Gains

THE ELECTION left the Democrats with no possible excuses. If they are not able to put through their legislative program and govern the country effectively after their President has a mandate by 15,000,000 votes and they have a substantial working majority in both houses, then they will have nothing to blame except their own ineptitude.

The major political question here now is whether the pro-Administration Democrats in the House of Representatives will make use of their gains effectively to consolidate their power. In the old House, the party division was 257 Democrats to 178 Republicans. Since upwards of 60 conservative Southern Democrats defected to the Republicans on most domestic issues, this meant that the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations did not have a working majority. Critical measures were won or lost by a few votes, depending upon the action of the liberal Republicans and certain moderate Southerners. In the new House, the Democrats have made a net gain of 38 seats, creating a party division of 295 Democrats to 140 Republicans.

The increase in liberal strength is slightly greater than these figures suggest. This is because six of the seven new Republican congressmen from the Deep South merely replace ultra-conservative Democrats, leaving the GOP-Dixie coalition no better off than before, while the new Democrats in the North and West have replaced mostly conservative Republicans The liberal and moderate Democrats were almost this strong in the Congress of 1959-60, but they found themselves frustrated by President Eisenhower's skillful use of the veto and the passive, traditionalist leadership of the late Speaker Sam Rayburn. They do not intend to be deprived of their victory a second time.

There are two routes the liberal Democrats can take to strengthen their control of the House. One lies through the party caucus and the other through changing the rules of the House. The advantage of the former is that it is a purely internal Democratic Party procedure in which the Republicans cannot interfere. If the rules of the House are to be changed, the entire membership can vote, providing the Southern Democrats an opportunity to coalesce with their Republican allies and possibly upset the liberal plans.

The most probable step the Democratic caucus will take is to purge two dissident Southerners who openly supported Senator Goldwater. They are Representatives John Bell Williams of Mississippi, an extreme segregationist and reactionary who is the ranking member of the important Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Representative Albert Watson of South Carolina, a second-termer of no importance. If the caucus disciplines them, they would drop to the bottom of the seniority list on their respective committees or might even be transferred, in the case of Williams, to a less consequential committee.

Several other conservative Southern Democrats, who tacitly supported Goldwater, would have been subject to the same treatment if the Democratic Study Group, the liberal faction in the House, had not outsmarted itself by giving a public warning of its purge intentions on the last day of this year's session. Because of this warning, congressmen such as Representative Otto Passman of Louisiana, the enemy of the foreign aid program, spoke well of Goldwater but refrained from endorsing him outright because they did not wish to jeopardize their committee seniority.

A purge of Williams and Watson is probable because it has the support of Speaker John McCormack. Party loyalty ranks very high in his personal creed. In 1961, when the reform of the Rules Committee was the issue, he favored simply purging the recalcitrant Southern members, but he was overruled by Rayburn who decided to enlarge the committee and outvote them.

There are several precedents in the history of the House for disciplining party rebels. The most striking was established in 1925 when the House Republican leadership stripped the Republican members from Wis-

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consin of their seniority and patronage for having supported the third-party candidacy of Robert M. LaFollette.

But how much further will Speaker McCormack go? The liberals would like two other changes to be made in the party caucus. At the present time, the caucus elects the 15 Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee who then function as a Committee on Committees and choose the membership of all other committees. The Democrats on Ways and Means—this is a highly prized post in the House—tend to be old-line party politicians from safe, machine-controlled districts. Typical is New York's member, Representative Eugene Keough of Brooklyn. Keough and his colleagues on Ways and Means make accommodations with their Southern brethren and give preference in committee assignments to Democrats who are "safe." The Democratic Study Group believes that if all the members of committees were elected by the caucus, it could get a better break for younger, liberal members.

The Study Group would also like to breach the seniority system by providing that the caucus choose committee chairmen from among the three senior members rather than the chairmanship going automatically on each committee to the member with the longest service. Both of these reforms would have unpredictable results. Since Speaker McCormack is cautious and, in his own way, as much a traditionalist as Rayburn, he and the rest of the central leadership are not likely to support them. Under these circumstances, their prospects are not good except for the outside chance that President Johnson decides privately to throw his influence behind either or both of them.

The changes in the House rules are more difficult to pilot to success, but nevertheless they are more likely to be attempted in January than a revolution in the party caucus. One rules change has broad support. It is a proposal to eliminate the necessity for an additional rule from the Rules Committee to send a bill to conference that has already been voted upon by both houses. This sounds minor and technical, but it has had important consequences particularly near the end of a session when the Rules Committee has simply refused to give a rule. A second proposal that has strong support would re-impose the 21-day rule which was in effect in 1949-50. Under this rule, the chairman of a legislative committee can call up his bill for a vote in the House if the Rules Committee has not released it for action after 21 days.

Both of these restraints on the arbitrary power of the Rules Committee would be unnecessary if Speaker McCormack would fight for a recommendation offered earlier this month by the American Assembly which discussed congressional reform at a four-day meeting at Arden House. The Assembly proposed that the Speaker have the power to appoint the majority members of the Rules Committee and, if he wishes, to serve as chairman himself. This would restore the Rules Committee to its proper subordinate role as an instrument of the central leadership, which is the role it played before the revolt in 1910 against Speaker Joe Cannon. This reform would end the irresponsible authority which the Rules Committee has usurped since 1939 to function as a supercommittee reviewing the work of all other committees.

THERE IS little doubt that the House would give Mr. McCormack this power in 1965 if he asked for it. But he is against such a move. On principle, he is a strict constructionist of the Speaker's power. He told me in an interview earlier this year: "A bad man ought not to have this much power, and a good man would not want it."

A third rules change would reduce the number of signatures on a discharge petition from 218 to 100. This would serve as a "shotgun behind the door" to be used against legislative committees which block important bills, as the Ways and Means Committee has blocked medicare for the past four years. Representative Henry Reuss of Wisconsin is the chief opponent of this reform which has the backing of this year's Democratic Platform. Here again the American Assembly made a useful recommendation. It suggested as an alternative to the figure of 218, that 150 signatures plus the Speaker be sufficient to move a bill out of committee. The purpose of tying the Speaker into this maneuver was to preclude the possibility that a minority of the House could use the discharge petition to force a vote prematurely.

A fourth possibility for strengthening Administration control of the House is to re-cast the partisan balance of the Ways and Means Committee. All other committees fluctuate in their makeup in proportion to the respective strength of the two parties in the whole House, but for the past 25 years, Ways and Means has been kept at 15 members for the majority and 10 for the minority. Nothing in the rules requires this. When the Democrats held three-quarters of the seats in 1937-38, they controlled Ways and Means by 18 to 7. There is considerable pressure from rank-and-file Democrats to revert to this more one-sided alignment. By coincidence, three Republican members of Ways and Means were defeated for re-election. If the Democrats were to fill these vacancies from their own ranks rather than leaving them to the Republicans, the Administration would have the necessary votes to report Medicare to the floor, notwithstanding the opposition of Chairman Wilbur Mills. On this one, the judgment of President Johnson will be decisive. If he concludes after talks with Mills that a reliable understanding has been reached to report Medicare, he will be satisfied with that and the status quo will stand. If Mills is obdurate, President Johnson will join with the liberal members and push Speaker McCormack to enlarge the Democratic strength on the committee.

WILLIAM V. SHANNON

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Exit the 'Arizona Mafia,' Exit the 'Eastern Establishment'

Recovering from Barry

WALTER DEAN BURNHAM

SURVIVORS of any great natural convulsion are likely to have considerable difficulty regaining their bearings. The 1964 election is an analogue of such a convulsion in the political world. This is not solely because President Johnson won 61.4 percent of the two-party vote. Massive as that performance was, it has been duplicated or approached in 1904, 1920, 1928, 1932 and 1936. But the mind boggles at the extraordinary pattern of polar reverse in American voting behavior which landed Vermont in the Democratic column and Georgia in the Republican column for the first time in our history.

From the moment Barry Goldwater was nominated in San Francisco, it became evident that 1964 was to be the most unusual presidential election in at least a generation. In more ways than one, the challenging party this year sought to duplicate William Jennings Bryan's 1896 effort to construct a sectional coalition of South and West against an Eastern Establishment. The issues were quite different in substance, to be sure: "Conservatism," corruption and civil rights in 1964, as contrasted with Free Silver and the iniquities of industrial capitalism in 1896. But Goldwater's appeal was addressed to a clientele which was strikingly similar to Bryan's. The results of 1896 demonstrated even in that long-ago age that a coalition composed of obsolescent elements could not hope to capture the Presidency. The party which made the attempt was condemned, with one interruption, to a forty-years' wandering in the political wilderness. The results of 1964—far more one-sided nationally than those of 1896—revealed that what had once been merely disastrous had become positively suicidal by 1964.

In view of the chaotically low level on which the campaign was pitched, it might seem reasonable to argue that the American people were not offered a "choice" after all. But it is difficult to escape the impression that a major confrontation *did* take place despite the campaign. No doubt the outcome was in some degree a vote of confidence for President Johnson, but from beginning to end this campaign was centrally focused on Senator Goldwater. It was a referendum on his central proposition that the whole consensus on public policy which has evolved since the 1930's was fundamentally wrong, that it had led to socialism, moral decay and anarchy at home and to Communist victory abroad. Not only was this proposition overwhelmingly rejected by the voters in November, but—as the polls indicated—it was rejected by them at the moment Goldwater was nominated, and they adhered to that choice with remarkable constancy throughout the four months that followed.

What broad patterns are revealed by the election returns? In a post-mortem, Republican Governor Smylie of Idaho has contended that the GOP in 1964 was on the wrong side of every major issue confronting the American people. This reality—which, restated, means that the Republican nominee had thrust his party almost wholly beyond the outer limits of our current political consensus—helps to explain both the remarkably uniform Johnson victory outside the cotton South and Goldwater's miniscule sectional victory in these five states. It is doubtful that most voters who swung away from the GOP were moved by anything more sophisticated than a pervasive, deep-seated but accurate feeling that Goldwater was not to be trusted on matters of basic domestic and foreign policy. But that was quite enough—as it has always been in moments of political crisis.

ON THE NATIONAL level the race issue was a dead loss for the Goldwater coalition. Outside the Deep South, where race was the only salient issue, the "white backlash" proved on the whole to be the most ephemeral political phenomenon of modern times. To be sure, it is clear that ethnic-stock Catholics swung less heavily to Johnson than most other groups outside the South. Admittedly there were also some exceptions in which spectacular racial tensions appear to have played some local role. In the Philadelphia area, for example, five predominantly Italian-American wards in South Philadelphia gave Johnson 64.1 percent of their vote compared with Kennedy's showing of 73.2 percent in 1960. The dominantly lower-middle-class Catholic suburb of Folcroft—where, as elsewhere in this Archdiocese, the

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Church has provided little leadership on the race issue —gave Kennedy 60.5 percent of its vote in 1960, but only 53.2 percent to Johnson in 1964.

In general, however, this election demonstrated conclusively that local racial tensions felt by the white population could not be effectively exploited on the presidential level. Moreover the attempt to do so, along with other aspects of the Goldwaterite image, not only solidified Negro support of the Democratic ticket but contributed to a really massive "frontlash" in normally solidly Republican areas. In the Philadelphia suburb of Montgomery County, for example, Nixon's 1960 majority of 50,584 was replaced in 1964 by a Johnson majority of 32,274. Whatever happened to our old and once seemingly so formidable friend, the "white backlash"? At least three factors are involved, and they tell us a good deal about the way the American political system actually operates. In the first place, white opinion about Negro civil-rights claims is normally both ambiguous and divided. When, as in housing and neighborhood problems, these claims intrude directly on ultrasensitive issues (e.g., the savings tied up in homes), they can produce fierce white resistance. The isolated Republican gains in the Philadelphia area and the California electorate's sweeping approval of a proposition to repeal the Rumford fair-housing law appear to demonstrate this. But where such pressures are not directly involved, a large part of the white population seems prepared to accept many Negro claims, especially in the areas of voting, public accommodations and school desegregation, as morally legitimate.

Secondly, presidential elections—unlike single-shot referenda and primary votes—are matters of complex choice for a great many voters. There is only a single executive to elect, and a wide range of policy stands by the candidates enters into the final choice. Race is necessarily cross-cut in presidential elections by such issues as social security, the role of organized labor, the tone of our foreign policy and a host of other matters. Whatever mileage Goldwater might have won from the race issue and his attack on "crime in the streets" was more than lost outside the Deep South by his reactionary economic views and his extremist views on our foreign policy. Thus it was entirely consistent with the American character and the American political system that the large majority of California voters rejected Goldwater and repealed the state's fair-housing law at the same time.

Finally, a point made by Samuel Lubell a number of years ago is worth recalling: no loss of a major group to a party coalition is an unmixed curse so long as it acts more or less in isolation. People vote not merely for or against candidates and parties but in hostile response to definable out-groups whose members and goals they dislike. As a major group deserts a party coalition, another hostile to that group tends to enter it. In 1964 it was obvious throughout the country —especially, one suspects, to Republicans in the professional-managerial classes—that Goldwater's campaign strategy rested heavily on abandoning the Negro and accepting the votes of Southern racists. The impression was undoubtedly confirmed for many both by Governor Wallace's antics and by Senator Thurmond's decision to join the "Goldwater Republican" party. Both Goldwater's strategy and these obvious Southern movements to his standard gave any whites with moderate or progressive racial views another major reason for voting against the Republican ticket. If the election of 1964 demonstrated anything at all, it revealed that it is normally immensely difficult to exploit racial unrest on a nationwide basis, and that efforts to do so can be expected to produce a powerful negative reaction from those whose moral sense is affronted.

THE RESULTS on the national level seem to discount the view that this was a sectionally-oriented election with similarities to the 1896 election. Certainly, except for the Deep South, virtually all major elements of the population joined more or less strongly in the surge to Johnson. A look beneath the surface tells a somewhat different story, however, and suggests that the analogy is not quite as far-fetched as it seems at first glance. Goldwater, of course, did best in the Deep South. These five states, alone in the country, showed a strong Republican gain in the face of the nationwide Johnson landslide. But even within these states a sharp polarization can be perceived—a 180-degree movement of partisan support from the presidential Republicanism of the Eisenhower years.

In Florida, for example, Johnson edged out Goldwater by carrying only 19 of its 67 counties, most of them heavily urbanized and forming much of the base for the Eisenhower-Nixon victories in the state during recent years. Goldwater, on the other hand, carried 24 counties in the rural, northern "panhandle" region which had never before gone Republican in modern times. In Georgia the pattern was much the same, Johnson doing well in the mountainous north where what Republican strength existed before 1952 was concentrated, and Goldwater carrying the once-solidly Democratic areas south of the fall line.

Outside the Deep South there was a broad band of states in which Goldwater won more than 40 percent of the vote: Illinois, Indiana, the states of the upper

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South, the far plains states from Oklahoma to North Dakota, all of the Rocky Mountain states except Colorado, and California. Adding the two groups of states together—those actually carried by Goldwater and those where he made a reasonably strong showing—a clearly sectional pattern closely approximating that formed in 1896 emerges. If in the end "Goldwater country" was submerged for the most part beneath the Johnson sea, it lay not too far below the surface after all.

It was in the Northeast that the closest parallel to the 1896 pattern emerged, and the full scope of the revulsion from Goldwater among traditionally—and supposedly rock-ribbed—Republican voters was revealed. Including the District of Columbia, there were 13 states in which Johnson received at least 65 percent of the vote: Alaska, Hawaii, Michigan and the Northeast from West Virginia to Maine. As the Deep South was the epicenter of a Goldwater earthquake, the Northeast was the epicenter of an anti-Goldwater convulsion. The magnitude of the shifts in the presidential vote which occurred there had to be seen to be believed. Not a single county in New England, New York, New Jersey or Delaware seems to have remained in the Republican column, and in Pennsylvania Goldwater held a slim lead in only four of the state's 67 counties. For anyone who is aware of the importance of historical voting traditions, the returns were quite a revelation.

It seems fair to say, moreover, that throughout this area—and probably in a good deal of the Midwest as well—the more solidly Republican the voting district had traditionally been, the stronger was the shift toward Johnson. While the Democratic shift was only about 10 percent in New York City, it reached extraordinary heights of between 25 and 35 percent in upstate New York, Vermont and Maine. If one hallmark of a sectional election is the obliteration of traditional patterns of voting cleavage *within* a given state or region, 1964 qualified handily throughout this vitally important region. While it is clear that an anti-Goldwater "frontlash" of normally Republican voters was necessary to produce this result, the magnitude of this "frontlash" needs to be explained.

SEVERAL YEARS ago a team of political scientists examined the attitudes of a sample of leaders and rank-and-file followers of the two parties along a broad range of policy issues. They wanted to know the degree to which policy differences actually existed between the parties. They were able to show that there were indeed significant differences between the elites of the two parties, but they also uncovered something which they had not anticipated. The gap on basic issues between Democratic party leaders and followers was not very great. But Herbert McClosky and his associates also discovered that there was a surprisingly large consensus between Republican party *followers* and both Democratic leaders and followers. The "out-group" in this situation was the group of Republican leaders; their conservative, business-oriented views were sharply out of phase with the policy consensus which prevailed among the other groups, including their own followers.

This may hold a key to understanding some of the peculiarities of the American party system, and especially the centrally important role which the group known as "liberal" or "presidential" Republicans has played since the 1930's. It is well known that party identification tends strongly to be a socially inherited characteristic similar to religious preference, and tending to have much the same sort of durability in non-metropolitan areas. In addition, contemporary mass politics in the metropolitan centers permits normal partisan identification to be overriden by special candidate appeals, particularly if the candidates of the weaker party are able successfully to blur the differences which tend to divide the "hard core" members of the two parties.

It seems to follow from this that many tradition-directed Republicans may be more "liberal" on major policy issues than is sometimes realized, and that the large floating "independent" or weakly-identified Democratic vote can be won only by those Republicans who have become adept at blurring partisan differences. This would suggest two things. Any sharp issue-polarization which is attempted by a stalwart exponent of right-wing fundamentalism, far from bringing out phantom hordes of conservative voters, may actually seriously jeopardize the party's mass base even in areas normally solidly under its control. Secondly, it will ensure that the moderate center which is weakly or not at all identified with either party will be repelled. In recent years we have witnessed two convincing demonstrations of this. In 1958 the ideological insistence by business groups that a right-to-work proposal be placed on the ballot in the industrial state of Ohio resulted in an electoral disaster not only for the proposal but for the GOP as well. In 1964 the same thing occurred, but on a nationwide scale and including a whole gamut of policy issues. As a result the GOP has been reduced to a shambles.

The moral of this argument seems plain enough. The bulk of the American people is centrist in its views. They seem actually to prefer the blurring rather than the sharpening of ideological differences. When—as in 1958 and 1964—the fundamentalist conservatives try to sharpen them, and thus make explicit the sharp antagonism between Republican and Democratic rank-and-filers and a rightist Republican leadership, the result is disaster for the issue-sharpeners. It follows that the "conservative" party has a significant chance to win—or even to remain intact in something approaching its historical form—only if it chooses moderate conservatives or even liberals to man its top posts. Only thus can issues be blurred enough to permit victory.

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The basic question arising in the aftermath of this landslide is whether these massive voter shifts portend permanent political realignment as they did in 1896, or —as was the case in 1904—simply reflect a more or less temporary aberration in the long-range flow of American voting behavior. Any adequate answer to this question depends upon three questions, and is likely to appear reasonably conclusive only over a considerable span of time. In the first place, it is clear that traditional voting commitments have been wrenched loose from their foundations among a huge proportion of the American electorate. But what next? Will these voters, having dealt the Goldwaterites a devastating blow, now return to the fold? Is the Republican upsurge in the Deep South a bubble which will soon burst, or is it built of more permanent stuff than that?

THIS QUESTION is inescapably linked with a second: what kind of Republican Party will now be fashioned out of the wreckage by the survivors? It seems quite clear—at least east of the Missouri and north of the Potomac—that by embracing Goldwaterism the GOP ran a grave risk with its future. It candidly uncovered the degree to which its leadership structure, even of pre-Goldwaterite vintage, tends to stand outside the broad policy consensus which apparently is shared even by many of its own rank-and-file supporters. Now that former Democrats have found it eminently respectable to vote Republican in Georgia, and former Republicans to vote Democratic in Vermont, will things ever really be the same again? On balance it seems probable that the damage to the GOP's image nationally has been severe and is likely to leave a lasting impression—one which may have worked to convert at least part of the "frontlash" permanently to the Democratic standard.

What happens in the future, however, may well be mightily influenced by the actions which the Republican leadership structure now takes. The way back to the "middle of the road" will not be easy. Before the party can present a realistic challenge to the Democrats on the national level, it will have to find its own soul. Not only Goldwaterites but a great many party regulars will find it extremely difficult to forgive the party's leading moderates for sitting on their hands. The cold fact that such moderates demonstrated great staying power at the polls in the face of the Johnson landslide will thus make far less impression within the party than the election returns would otherwise merit.

But the far right has also been seriously discredited in the eyes of party professionals because of its clear repudiation at the polls. The ordinary rules of American politics would dictate their removal from top policy posts within the National Committee and elsewhere. If this should fail to happen, of course, a permanent realignment of forces would clearly be in the offing. Even assuming that it does, however, the internecine struggle runs so deep that the triumph of either the liberal or the far-right wings of the party in the near future could easily tear it apart.

Despite the inner torments which now rack the GOP, it seems probable that some sort of compromise will be worked out which the major contending forces can accept. But the probable terms of any such compromise —which probably would have to center around such orthodox conservatives of the Midwestern party as Gerald Ford of Michigan—suggest the truth of the proposition that the GOP's center of gravity has been shifted considerably to the right.

If Senator Taft in 1952 had been a choice of Republican moderates poised between the Eisenhower-oriented Easterners and a formidable far-right wing, the party would have been confronted with a somewhat analogous situation to the one it appears to face in the mid-1960's. The notion of a Taft as the only acceptable compromise candidate suggests something of the distance which the GOP has traveled in the past decade. Such a solution would probably win back a large number of temporary Johnson voters in the upstate Northeast and the Midwest, but it would be very unlikely in the foreseeable future to win all of them back, or to make enough inroads into the weakly-committed swing vote to have much chance of winning a presidential election under ordinary circumstances.

If the Arizona Mafia is destined to pass into limbo, it seems equally clear that the salad days of the "Eastern Establishment" are over within the GOP, even though it is the latter which keeps finding candidates who can win elections in the large industrial states. Such is the stuff of which the nearly insoluble dilemma now confronting the Republican Party is composed. It may well require the passing of the present generation of party leaders before the agonizing tensions which now convulse the GOP are finally eased.

But permanence of this party balance also critically depends on the answer to a third question: what will President Johnson and the Democratic Party now do with their victory? The 40-seat Democratic gain in the House of Representatives has broken the back of the Conservative Coalition there for the time being, and has given the party's liberals a once-in-a-generation chance not only to enact their party's program into law but to make fundamental changes in the very structure and organization of the House. But the future of such programs ultimately depends upon President Johnson and the ability of contemporary liberalism to construct a record which the broad middle of the American electorate is willing to accept. Johnson's popular mandate is enormous but also essentially negative, and consequently extremely hard to define. It seems certain that Johnson cannot forever remain "President of all the people." When the hard decisions are made, a good deal will be clear which is now obscure.

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A Tendency to Rely on the Formulas of Institutional Religion

Christianity in Harlem

PHILIP F. BERRIGAN

"HARLEM" as William Stringfellow says in *My People Is the Enemy*, "is plainly representative of the congestion and destitution in which most people in most of the world, through most of history and even nowadays, live . . . [It] is the reminder and witness in American society of all the world's poor." Harlem is also, to continue William Stringfellow's analysis, the national symbol of the religious edifice in the ghetto, and the best example we have of the assets and liabilities of organized religion among Negroes.

The Christian Church in Harlem is many things, immersed as it is in what has been called a powerless colony, run economically, politically and socially by a remote power center in downtown New York. The individual churches express the best and worst of Harlem as well as the diversity, dynamism and division of Christianity itself. Any understanding of Christianity in Harlem must take into account the durable structure of the Roman Catholic and Anglican parishes; the religious and political bastion of Representative Powell at Abyssinian Baptist Church; the middle-class Negroes who commute to Harlem for worship; the church real estate, investments and rent from old-law tenements; the store-front and walk-up churches, with their social services, Black Nationalist religion, or varieties of quackery; the Negro and White Protestant ministers who travel to their flocks from New Rochelle, Fort Lee and the Bronx; the church-going women who represent the matriarchy of the Harlem slum; the social services offered to junkies, the unhoused and the unemployed, slow learners and dropouts; the youngsters of HARYOU-ACT and the Harlem Educational Program; veterans like Msgr. Owen Scanlon and Rev. Mel Schoonover; the gentleman's agreements with politicians; the inevitable ambiguity, demagoguery and fidelity, in short the whole range of betrayal and dedication, that marks the human response to Christ.

Has Christianity in Harlem failed? Can one observe there, first-hand evidence for the historical disenchantment of the Negro with Christianity? Or, on a more fundamental level, is Christianity in Harlem a symbol of its own failure to meet the reality of Negro urban life? The answer would depend on the meaning given "failure." In one sense, the Christian Church in Harlem has not failed, any more than it has failed in other parts of America. Institutionally, Christianity is a substantial success there—in fact, one cannot in any true sense speak of institutional failure as long as the present attention is given to the erection and maintenance of church real estate.

By the same token, one has no evidence at all that Negroes (or whites) long to any great extent for a church that does not give priority to a Christianity of acceptance and arrival, symbolized by religious brick and mortar. Status is often an overriding factor with the churchgoing Negro, and status is furthered by identification with the permanence and stability of any institutionalized church. And so, dollars will continue their religious support from within and without Harlem, to consolidate the established forms of church life, to extend to the Negro one of the more important criteria for acceptance in white America. (Negroes, it goes without saying, are more vulnerable to such illusions than whites.)

In a more crucial sense, the Harlem churches may well have failed in the building of a Christian community. Christians there have too seldom taken their religious mandate from the condition of the people, too seldom confronted the effects of wretched housing, malnutrition, unemployment, inferior education, narcotics addiction and alcoholism. They have given insufficient attention to the fragmentation and despair of the Harlem people, and to their dull accommodation to misery and exploitation.

The churches of Harlem have noticeably failed as community because they do not sufficiently understand their only claim to relevance in Harlem or elsewhere. They do not seem to understand fully that any valid Christian witness depends upon a prior risk, since a servant church will always cause united and explosive reactions, all of them critical, many of them purgative and remedial. They do not seem to understand that the ministry of truth and service, from a position of purity and non-alignment, is the only one which men cannot ignore; and is, for that reason, the only true sign of hope. They do not seem to understand that the apparent failure of ministering to the hopeless and ostracized is the only force which, paradoxically, insures a valid ministry to all men.

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Harlem is thus a kind of laboratory for universal Christianity. The strange and complex confusion of aims, which currently disperses the moral energy of the Christian ethic, is made abruptly clear in Harlem by the condition of the people, and by the curious refusal of many churches to associate themselves with that condition. The ministers of various denominations, with brave and notable exceptions, tend to rely upon the formulas of institutionalized religion, or upon the imported solutions of economics, politics and sociology as panaceas for the wretchedness of Harlem, rather than upon the kind of evangelical candor that the Council is suggesting to the Christian world. Denominational advantage, competition in membership, money, another building and another service—these are the concerns which, ironically, are offered as the evangelism of a worshipping community of God.

The Negroes of Harlem are approached by many of their religious leaders as another immigrant bloc, which is years away from assimilating the mechanics and standards of American life, as exemplified by the white man. By and large, it is assumed that Negroes will accede to a value system which has never, to any significant degree, absorbed the concept of Negro equality, nor opted for Negro assimilation. In this respect, the Harlem churches reflect the mentality of middle-class white communities across the country—the only difference being that the Harlem membership is Black. Such a mentality can hardly have the rationale and tools needed to build a Christian community.

Harlem Christianity tends to sponsor a style of life which has strong overtones of the middle-class majority myth. Pulpit pietism is too prone to bless and support prevailing social and economic mores, and, unconsciously, to placate white power by the development of a Negro whose view of life, including religious life, is so similar to the white man's that there is less reason to fear him. Class, or status within a class, is the common implication of the message. The image of the congregation offers a status appeal which is both attractive and ambiguous—a community of the good, the predictable, the proper, who concentrate on moral individualism and show a contempt for most of the shoddy business of Harlem life. In short, the message successfully asks for and gets a political and social neutrality in almost all areas save one: the rights and support of organized religion.

It has been remarked that the Harlem churches are the symbol of white America going to the Negro, on what is assumed to be a religious mission One is reminded, in this regard, of the naivete of the Christian mission in past centuries to the Chinese, or to Black Africans. Somehow, the lessons and failures of the colonial missions have been ignored, and the elements of incomprehension and paternalism are as crippling today as formerly. The professional staffs are white, or a black facsmile thereof; and though some have won the psychological adjustment necessary for detached service, others are restive under accommodation, while still others have made their fiat to Harlem realities. Inevitably, the common absence of perception and commitment allows the churches little chance for cohesive action, let alone the energy to face the lethargy and broken promises of City Hall, or the power of slumlords and racketeers.

Because religion seems to have committed itself to objectives and alliances that have rather slender connection with theology and mission, its position in the racial crisis is a problematic one. Indeed, the churches are part of the racial dilemma of Harlem: not in the sense of serious involvement in it, but because they have helped to bring it about, and help to perpetuate it: by their tenacious tie to the artificial framework of our society, through the mentality of their clergy and the conditioning of their laity; by their hypersensitivity to power and the advantages of power; by their piety toward the status quo.

Concretely, the religious deficit in Harlem may mean insufficient care of the poor; it may mean the absence of Christian protest, or ecumenism in the social apostolate; but it does mean, above all, the lack of significant lay leadership. There are, in fact, few Christian laymen in the parishes and churches of Harlem who manifest leadership in terms of Christian witness. It has been contended by way of excuse that potential leaders have fled Harlem to escape the tenements, the inadequate police protection, the filth, brutality and despair. But the leaders who have gone could not qualify in the strict apostolic sense; they were merely good and stable people who would no longer endure the abominable conditions.

The key point is that the churches have had little influence in holding such people to any sense of responsibility to Harlem. Neither have they been noticeably effective in recruiting replacements, even as a sort of permanent moral presence. More often than not, the churches do not seem to realize the need for lay leadership, do not have the resources to train it, do not desire it or trust it. The general levity with which the layman is regarded almost everywhere is focused in Harlem on

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a community assumed to be indefinitely removed from the possibility of responsible witness. By implication, the school, the club that tries to keep the young off the street, the adult group which meets and talks and plans support of the plant, all cater to a layman who must endure what can't be changed; who must shun what isn't "good," including association with publicans and sinners; who must realize that religion is one of the doors to acceptance, and that social power alone will predicate the terms of the Negro future.

MEANWHILE, the spectacle of Harlem life goes on—the massive destruction of human promise, the isolated emergence and heroism, the community whose only effective protest is to rage against itself, as it did in the summer "riots." The tenements continue to crumble, the rats breed and thrive, the anger festers and destroys, the congregations go about their worship and education and plant maintenance, simply because the decision has come from outside and has been accepted within, that there is no changing Harlem, and that no changes will be offered there.

To an exceptional degree however, changes are being worked by Chambers Memorial Baptist Church, by St. Charles Borromeo Parish, by East Harlem Protestant Parish, by the little knots of Christian community which the Spirit forms here and there. These are voices of witness, it is true, and they may well provide the direction of renewal. But they are voices from the wilderness.

What changes are required in the Harlem churches, if change is to come to Harlem society? The search for self-awareness must be intensified, the Gospel must be relearned, community must be rebuilt from Word and worship, service must be provided for the suffering neighbor. This does not necessarily mean a panoply of good works; but it does mean a living witness to God's Truth and His Redemptive Power, which *might* mean the ministry to the poor, which *might* mean a constant and powerful cry against the organized inhumanity which keeps Harlem ringed-in, despairing.

Such an orientation would enable Christianity to be itself, would enable it to identify with whatever people it was serving, would break it from its sterile alliance with an indifferent or hostile majority, whose emoluments demand a price far beyond their worth. In such an atmosphere, renewal would be profound, social reconciliation would be imaginative and widespread, ecumenism would thrive, and history might well record that Harlem is the place where the Negro brought forth the full Christian meaning of the Church.

The treatment of the Negro is the measure of Christianity in this country. Harlem is a microcosm of both the American religious climate, and the American racial panorama. The little or larger versions of Harlem grow apace in every area of this country, with similar deprivations of housing, employment, education and equal treatment under law.

As the racial issue narrows for all America; as the lessons of Harlem, Rochester, Philadelphia and Jersey City continue to be obscured and misinterpreted; as the non-violent leadership of the Civil Rights groups falls into jeopardy; as the Negro revolution tends to become an insurrection; so also the issue narrows for Christians. And one question remains. What future is there for any church or churches which abandoned the Negro, or misread his needs, even with the best intentions? We may yet have to live with the answer to that bitter question.

Neither the U.S. nor Africa Acted in Time

Breakdown in the Congo

VICTOR C. FERKISS

THE COMIC opera aspects of Congo premier Moise Tshombe's recent misadventures at the non-aligned nation's conference in Cairo should not be allowed to obscure their deeper significance. The Congo, torn by internal disorder and foreign intervention, is a problem not only to itself and the great powers of the world but it is, above all, a problem—and to date an insoluble one—for the whole movement for African self-determination and unity. African nationalists have many reasons to hate Tshombe: his complicity in the murder of Lumumba, his role as leader of a Katangese separatist regime that was largely a Belgian creation, his use of white—especially South African—mercenaries in the current Congolese civil war, and his overt and unashamed ties with various Western interests. But above all he is hated, albeit perhaps subconsciously, because his Congo seems to give the lie to African claims that, left to themselves, they can solve their own internal and international problems.

That the Congo has so spectacularly failed to keep its own house in order and has shown so little capacity

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for self-government that it has become an arena of activity not only for such traditional colonial nations as Britain, France, and Belgian but also for such distant powers as the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China would in itself be bad enough. Such a situation in the smallest African state would be a source of frustration and alarm to the other independent African nations and a threat to Africa's future.

But the Congo is not just another African state. One of the largest countries in Africa both in population and in area, it contains—in the Katanga especially—one of Africa's most developed industrial complexes. Though higher education was neglected by the Belgian colonial administration, the Congo before independence had the highest literacy rate in Africa and an unusually large pool of skilled and semi-skilled labor. Above all, its location is of the utmost strategic importance in intra-African politics.

For not only does the Congo border on nine other African states, it is the link between North and South, East and West—the geographic crossroads of Africa. And it is a political crossroads as well. The independence of Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia) under an African nationalist government removes some of the importance of Katanga as a salient for African nationalism's southward thrust into what has been the continent's "white redoubt"—"European"-controlled Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and the Republic of South Africa. But the Congo government still holds the key to rebellion in geographically contiguous and tribally related Angola, and the ability of the rebel government of Holden Roberto—recognized as legitimate by many African states—to survive is primarily dependent on Leopoldville's favor. A Congolese government not committed to African nationalism as it is generally understood—including, above all, African pressures on southern Africa's white governments—represents not only a substantial defection for the African cause, but the defection of a comrade occupying a key position.

Equally important to Africa's future are the respects in which the long, bitter and bloody Congolese crisis has psychologically undercut the hitherto triumphant drive of the Africans to attain self government as nations and as a continent. From the outset, the circumstances of the Congolese crisis were a defeat for African public relations in the world. The African image suffered not only from the fact that, for the first time in the African march toward freedom, independence had been accompanied by bitter and bloody interracial violence (Algeria never presented the same clear picture of a racial struggle); it suffered also from the bitterness of the political conflict among the Congolese themselves and the resurrection of inter-tribal conflict as a result of the distintegration of the restraints placed upon it by the colonial administration. Africans were forced to smart under crude jokes about the barbarity which erupted, barbarity which seemed to confirm stereotypes about Africa long present in the minds of many whites in Europe and America, stereotypes which the peaceful transition to independence of a score of African states had begun to erase. In addition, Tshombe's role as premier of the break-away regime of Katanga was deplored by Africans not only because he appeared to be a puppet of Belgian mining interests, but also because the possibility of separatist movements is an omnipresent specter for every African government. Arguments about Katanga's self-determination, however disingenuous, forced African leaders at last to explicitly repudiate the concept of self-determination except as applied to political entities still under colonial rule, thus compelling them to admit publicly what they had long admitted privately that the arbitrary political units which were the much lamented creation of colonialism had as much logical validity as any other national units that might be created in Africa.

ALL THE conditions which made the Congo breakdown appear so shocking could be explained by other Africans as the fruit of Belgian misrule: the real racist pressures behind the facade of Belgian interracial paternalism, Belgian failure to train or permit the growth of adequate Congolese leadership, Belgian failure to integrate the disparate tribes of the Congo (or even in many cases to do anything to remove them from their traditional state), and after independence Belgian encouragement to separatist tendencies such as those exemplified by the movements of Tshombe and Albert Kalonji. But if the disease was of colonialist origin, it had to be cured by Africans: if the Congolese could not overcome their unfortunate heritage, it was up to their fellow Africans to provide the solution, since the only possible alternatives were continued chaos or a return to paternalistic government by white outsiders. Not only would such conditions be extremely galling to the new-found pride of the Africans, but their very existence would cast discredit upon African contentions that the Africans of Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa were likely candidates for immediate self-rule without continued outside tutelage.

But how were the Africans to cure the Congo's ills? Even if the United States and the Soviet Union had not immediately entered the Congo picture, it would still have been impossible for the African states to have taken over in the Congo, thus affording it the support and counsel of elder brothers rather than of strangers. Economic and logistical considerations precluded this, as did the divergence of views among the African nations themselves as to what character the political future of the Congo should assume. Hence the overwhelming African support for UN intervention, and also the argu-

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ments among Africans and between Africans and non-Africans over the form that this intervention should take.

The UN intervention provided, for the short run at least, a means of restoring some measure of political and legal order in the Congo and of providing some economic and administrative support for its failing government, support beyond the capacities of the Africans themselves to give, yet untainted with the stigma of a re-imposition of colonialism. But some of the African states, especially the so-called Casablanca powers (in particular Ghana, Guinea, Mali and the United Arab Republic), had definite ideas about how the Congo and the UN operation there should be run which differed from those of the United States and its supporters in the UN. From the outset these nations were interested not only in keeping the United States and the Soviet Union from a direct confrontation in the Congo, and in preventing the Belgians from reasserting control of the Congo's most important resources through their influence with the Tshombe regime; they also wished to see a strong central government set up—one resembling their own in its emphasis on national unification and administrative centralization, with a single mass party dominating the nation's political life, and exhibiting certain overt forms of hostility toward the former colonial rulers. Patrice Lumumba not only was better known personally to the leaders of other African states than were Kasavubu or Mobutu, but he stood for these principles while Kasavubu, Mobutu and Tshombe did not. After Lumumba's death the other African states reluctantly accepted the American-sponsored Kasavubu-Adoula regime since the leftist Gizenga regime clearly offered no real alternative militarily or politically. Besides rooting for Lumumba's triumph in Leopoldville, and for Leopoldville's triumph over Tshombe, some African leaders flirted with the idea of an all-African peacekeeping force in the Congo, which would have been not only a symbolic victory for African nationalism but also would have given the Africans greater leverage in the confused internal situation. When this proved obviously impractical, they redoubled their efforts to influence the UN operation. Eventually they brought the United States around to their belief that Tshombe had to be destroyed politically and a strong central government established.

BUT THE United Nations operation in the Congo—although it succeeded in preventing a direct confrontation between the major cold war powers and in restoring Katanga to the nation as a whole did not succeed in making the Congo a politically viable state. To no one's surprise the departure of UN troops from the Congo (where they had become anathema to most Congolese politicians and civilians alike for reasons of national pride) has led to a recurrence of anarchy. The Congolese army which was to have taken the place of the UN troops has proved to be more than inadequate, and its panic and disorganization have added nothing to the luster of African arms, rubbing salt in the wounds of African nationalists everywhere. Tshombe has not only returned to the Congo but to a position, however precarious, of national leadership within it. Rebellion, motivated as much by personal and tribal considerations as ideological ones, is flourishing, supported by neighboring Burundi and the former French Congo, and has laid waste much of the country. Chinese Communist agents have added fuel to the fire, and the United States has begun a tentative, half-hearted and ambivalent intervention, partly in response to Chinese initiatives and partly in order to shore up the only national regime there is. The future of the Congo looks as bleak as it did prior to United Nations intervention, but with one crucial difference: there is no question that both political and financial considerations make it impossible for the United Nations to return to the Congo.

This new situation confronts the United States and the African nations with a set of cruel dilemmas, and has created tensions which have set the United States and African nationalists at each other diplomatically and politically, and has destroyed much of the mutual confidence built up during their collaboration in the UN operation which reintegrated Katanga with the Congo. The United States is uncomfortable in dealing with Tshombe—a man it had once bitterly opposed—and equally uncomfortable in appearing to collaborate with South African and Belgian mercenaries in putting down rebellion. Yet it sees little alternative to support of Tshombe. Even if the extent of Chinese influence among the rebels be discounted, as to a large extent it must be, either a rebel victory or a continued state of anarchy would create a situation offering the same possibilities for subversion and great power conflict which the United States sought to avoid through its past support of the UN intervention.

Yet the United States cannot afford an African Vietnam—it cannot do so politically, militarily, or economically. On this point most American commentators of both left- and right-wing persuasions are agreed. What then is the solution? The obvious one seems to be to leave the problem to the Africans themselves—specif-

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ically to the recently formed Organization of African Unity, which has among its goals both settling of inter-African disputes and keeping non-African powers out of African affairs. Africans agree. But in principle only. Practice is something else again.

Tshombe, largely under American pressure, has agreed to ask for help from other African states in suppressing the rebellion. He is aware that his army cannot do the job and that, if it is not done, even as clever and opportunistic a politician as he is—and he is that rather than a "tool of Belgium," a "defender of western civilization," or a crypto-Communist, as he has been variously styled by different commentators—cannot hope to survive. His use of foreign mercenaries was clearly a last-minute desperation move to attempt to solve the problem before it was necessary to call in the other African states.

But the other African states are not interested in sending troops. For one thing most of them hate Tshombe either for his past role or for his success as a political operator. Many of them sincerely believe that the rebel regime is a rightful successor to the holy cause of Lumumba and Gizenga or else a natural and healthy response to the present conditions of disorder and corruption which everyone admits exists. They either fear taking sides or would prefer to take the side of the rebels. Association with either white mercenaries or the American C.I.A. (apparently active in the civil war in its often puttering fashion) is anathema to them. But at the same time they are genuinely fearful of increased Communist influence (though convinced that if necessary they can contain it) and are also afraid that if they do not act the United States or other Western powers will.

The cruelty of their dilemma is heightened by an often overlooked fact, which has a vital psychological impact. The military forces of the members of the O.A.U. are limited in size and efficiency. Some, such as the Ethiopians, are hated by many Congolese for their conduct during the UN operation. But, more important, most African troops are needed at home. Africa has been shaken during the past several years by a series of military coups, some successful, some not, and by a series of alleged plots to overthrow governments, plots real, exaggerated, or concocted to justify destroying all opposition. Few African leaders are now willing to allow their very limited trained and trusted troops to forego internal security duties for involvement in other nations, from which their speedy return would be difficult to arrange. Even if the African states were wholeheartedly in favor of supporting Tshombe, implementing their support would be another matter.

The result is that the ball is being passed back and forth between the O.A.U. and the United States with relations steadily worsening, as evidenced, among other indications, by the support of many African nations for anti-American resolutions at the non-aligned nations conference at Cairo. Both the United States government and the African states can be faulted for having made no adequate contingency plans for what they full well knew would follow the departure of UN forces from the Congo last June 30. The United States is deserving of criticism because its greater experience in world politics means it should have known better. The O.A.U. is at fault for its pious and demagogic rhetoric about Africans solving African conflicts. The United States is taking refuge in its usual technique of sending numerous officials abroad to study the situation in the hope it will go away (a technique perfected in other areas of the world), neither taking action nor protecting itself against pressure to act when it is too late to do so effectively. The African states, however, are reacting in a fashion which, while equally unrealistic, is perhaps more dangerous. Moral condemnation of Tshombe for past crimes and current peccadilloes is driving them closer to supporting his enemies, and distrust of the half-hearted United States action is leading them to forget the immensely greater danger of a Communist beachhead being established in the vacuum left by their own and U.S. failure to act decisively.

If the United States had washed its hands of responsibility before the United Nations withdrawal and told the Africans that, although the United States would help financially and logistically, pacifying the Congo was the Africans' problem, and *if* it had done this in time, it is possible that the advent of Tshombe might have been averted and a government which the O.A.U. could support might have been maintained in power. If the Africans had responded in time the situation might not have deteriorated to the point it has now reached. Instead the still unsuppressed rebellions continue to destroy not only material resources but precious trained manpower as well.

The Congo is a skeleton on the doorstep of the independent African states. And if the domestic failure of the Congo is allowed to become an international failure of the African continent to solve its own problems, the consequences could be disastrous.

What Is It in the Mind

What is it in the mind that makes it so
eager to pack up all its things and go,
and what in the heart that would remain,
rejoicing in oftenkind, open and same?

Ruthly the ruthless longing for home
for sooth or for soothing rips soul from the bone.
One fusses and fidgets and waits in the car
while heart gleans her last glance and
backs out the door.

SISTER M. ANASTASIA CALLOW

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"Protestantism and Authority"

Minneapolis, Minn.

TO THE EDITORS: As a (somewhat uncomfortable) Protestant, I was eager to read what Robert McAfee Brown would say about "Protestantism and Authority [Oct. 9]," especially since it was in this general area that he came off weakest in his otherwise excellent dialogue with Father Gustave Weigel. I must confess that his recent COMMONWEAL article was equally disappointing. Were it not for the repeated demonstrations given us of Dr. Brown's intellectual integrity, one might be tempted to call his handling of this critical question somewhat less than honest. Is this perhaps one of the few issues where the current Protestant position is so vulnerable that even the most determinedly honest Protestant dare not allow himself to see matters quite clearly?

Dr. Brown relies mainly upon the fact, admitted by all informed persons, that a large measure of variation and freedom is permitted, and exists, within the Roman Church as to certain important questions. One must give plus marks to Rome for this, where its position—both now and historically—compares favorably with that Protestant Fundamentalism which Dr. Brown deprecates as the only genuine locus of a certain idealized "theological *securitas*." So far so good, and he has made a valid and important point.

But I note an interesting fact, which I doubt is accidental, about his specific examples of intra-Roman variation in belief or interpretation. They all deal with ecclesiology, rather than with the core beliefs of (let us say) Nicene Christianity. I grant him that Papal infallibility is critical for defining the Roman form of Catholicism, and hence is not, as he emphasizes, "peripheral." But surely neither Dr. Brown nor Cardinal Ottaviani would hold that the infallibility is as central to being a Christian as, say, the belief that "Christ died for my sins."

Now it is a fact that one can attend a Roman Catholic service, or converse with a Roman Catholic priest, or read a Roman Catholic tract, anywhere in the world without experiencing the slightest ambiguity as to any of the following: That God is a spirit, in some important —though analogical—way "personal," distinct from the created order; that God's Providence is over all things, so that everything that happens in the created order is by His active or permissive will; that Jesus Christ is truly a union of human nature with the pre-existent Logos, and hence qualitatively different from Aristotle or Mohammed; that Jesus Christ was crucified for our sins and rose again for our justification; that the sacraments are efficacious means of grace; that human beings survive bodily death in a genuine, literal sense involving sufficiently personal continuity of ego to warrant saying "*I* shall live forever"; and that the conditions of this survival are potentially a function of one's convictions and actions in the present life. Of course there are hypocrites, cynics, and belly-servers in all denominations. But is Dr. Brown prepared to assert that any Roman priest or bishop, anywhere, any time, openly denies *or even waters down* any of these essential Christian doctrines with impunity? I have heard many sermons and read many writings by Roman Catholic clergy, and cannot call to mind one single instance of such.

By contrast, every one of these central doctrines of historic Christianity is at times denied, more often bypassed, and most often "re-interpreted" by a sizeable proportion of Protestant clergy in every major Protestant denomination except the Fundamentalist wing which Dr. Brown typifies by "Southern Baptist," and possibly the Christian Reformed. I can testify of my own knowledge, as the lawyers say, that there are Anglicans, Methodists, Presbyterians, Northern Baptists, Congregationalists, and now—alas—even Lutherans, both lay and clerical, who disbelieve one or more of these core Christian teachings. Over the last thirty years, I have myself conversed with clergymen in all these denominations who held—when pressed, and prevented from avoidant tactics and double-talk—views indistinguishable from Pantheism, Humanism, Arianism, Unitarianism, Buddhism, or plain Agnosticism. I cannot think that Dr. Brown is unaware of these facts, or that he believes them to be without influence upon the convictions and practices of perceptive Protestant laymen. Unless I am badly mistaken, it is an easily defensible generalization that *whenever a Protestant body achieves sufficient scholarliness and intellectual honesty to abandon Fundamentalism, it next proceeds to undergo a steady erosion of Christian faith and practice.* Can Dr. Brown point to one single historical exception to this remarkable phenomenon? (Watch the confessional Lutherans and the Christian Reformed; I confidently record my prediction that they will do it next. It never fails.)

It seems to me that we Protestants should frankly admit that the problem of authority is a major—perhaps *the* major—weakness in our present position. It is simply not true that Rome has a problem of the same sort, and we ought not to try to make out that she really has. She does have *a* "problem of authority," and it's pretty clear today what that problem is! But it's not the same, even remotely, as the Protestant problem. Rome is gingerly

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and reluctantly repenting of her sins in overdoing the monolithic authority business. I would suggest that the ecumenical dialog on this important topic would be best served on the Protestant side by a clear, non-defensive admission that intellectually responsible Protestantism has a terrible problem of authority and, further, that it simply has no plausible solution for this problem at the present time. Who are we kidding? PAUL E. MEEHL

Reply

TO THE EDITORS: It is encouraging—and humbling—to be taken as seriously as I have been taken by Mr. Meehl, and I find his letter stimulating and challenging. On some points, I think we can find agreement, though on some others I'm afraid we are rather far apart.

Let me assure Mr. Meehl, first of all, that I agree with him wholeheartedly that the current Protestant understanding of authority is, as he says, "vulnerable." To his concluding comment that "intellectually responsible Protestantism has a terrible problem of authority," I can only say *Nihil obstat*, and I regret that my own recognition of this fact didn't come through. When Mr. Meehl writes, "It seems to me that we Protestants should frankly admit that the problem of authority is a major—perhaps *the* major—weakness in our present position." I can only concur, and offer as documentation of my honest concurrence that when I wrote more fully on this problem in *The Spirit of Protestantism*, I entitled my chapter, "Authority: The Achilles Heel of Protestantism," and did not, I hope, duck the reasons why we are in real difficulty at this point. I cite this not in self-defense, but simply to reassure Mr. Meehl, and also Roman Catholic readers, that I am at least not deliberately seeking to ignore problems. I don't think we are, in Mr. Meehl's phrase, "kidding" anybody.

At a second point, however, I must take issue. Mr. Meehl makes a distinction within Roman Catholicism between what he calls "core beliefs" and other items of Catholic faith, in order to suggest that the problems Catholics and Protestants face are of a different order. He suggests, for example, that ecclesiology is not at the center of these core beliefs. I have difficulty accepting this contention, and should think a Catholic would likewise have difficulty accepting it, since in the Catholic faith the gospel is necessarily bound up with ecclesiology and a very specific kind of ecclesiology at that. Mr. Meehl insists that both Cardinal Ottaviani and I surely distinguish between infallibility on the one hand and belief that "Christ died for my sins" on the other. Far be it from me to speak for Cardinal Ottaviani, but I find it hard to believe that he or any other Catholic would confidently affirm the latter without also affirming the former, and I doubt if he could honestly deny the former without placing in jeopardy the latter.

The notion of different levels of importance in areas of revealed dogma would be most difficult, I would think, for a Catholic to maintain. I make this assertion, subject to correction, in the light of Pius XII's statement at the end of *Munificentissimus Deus*, when, after defining the Dogma of the Assumption of the Virgin into Heaven, he concludes, "Therefore, if anyone, which may God forbid, should dare either to deny this, or voluntarily call into doubt what has been defined by Us, he should realize that he has cut himself off *entirely* (*prorsus*) from the divine and Catholic faith (Denzinger 2333)." I interpret this to mean that there are not "core beliefs" and peripheral beliefs within the realm of revealed dogma, and that ecclesiology, Mariology and so on are part of the Catholic faith conceived of as in indivisible whole, within which it is not permissible to make the sort of qualitative distinctions Mr. Meehl would like to make.

A third point has to do with the degree of interpretation possible within Roman Catholic understanding. As I tried to suggest in my article, and as Mr. Meehl to a limited degree acknowledges, there is considerable leeway here. Certainly no Catholic "denies" the things Mr. Meehl asserts as "core beliefs," but here, too, it seems to me quite clear that there are differing ways of *interpreting* these so-called "core convictions." There is not *a* Catholic interpretation of the assertion that "Jesus Christ was crucified for our sins," to cite one of Mr. Meehl's examples, and this can be given many kinds of meanings and expressed in many kinds of ways which do not necessarily involve diminution or destruction of the belief. It is not without significance that the Church has never formally defined a doctrine of atonement. What I am arguing for here is simply what Pope Paul and Cardinal Léger and others have argued for, in warning against "theological immobilism," as though all truth could be contained within a particular way of expressing the truth. At this point there can be great growth in understanding and interpretation.

But the fourth and crucial point—and indeed the real thrust of Mr. Meehl's letter—has to do not with what is going on in Catholicism, but with what is going on in Protestantism. For it is his assertion that Protestants, in reflecting upon the faith, engage in a watering-down of the faith, a dilution, even a denial of it. Catholics may re-interpret but they do not change the substance of what they re-interpret; Protestants, on the other hand, do change and finally destroy the substance of what they seek to re-interpret. As soon as Protestantism achieves any intellectual honesty, it engages in "a steady erosion of Christian faith and practice."

My difficulty in coming to grips with this sobering charge is that I do not know what, on Mr. Meehl's terms, is to be understood as normative Christian faith. I have the feeling that for him "real" Christianity is very close to Fundamentalism—whether he accepts that version of the faith or not—and that naturally any departure from it

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can be construed as evil. If that is not quite fair, it is at least fair to insist that in order to make the charge he makes, Mr. Meehl must posit a fairly definitive statement of what the Christian faith *is,* so that we can know that from which all else is deviation. Now my difficulty is that even if we agree on a series of statements (say, the Nicene Creed), we cannot avoid the necessity of *explaining what we mean by the statements we use,* and this latter task, it seems to me, can and will need to be done in every generation, but not necessarily in a way that involves diminution and erosion. Thus I am not prepared to believe that all roads from Fundamentalism are roads to syncretism, eclecticism and destruction. They may in fact be roads that lead to a fuller understanding of the gospel than Fundamentalism possessed. This seems to be the point of greatest divergence between Mr. Meehl and myself.

Mr. Meehl asks for "one single historical exception" to the phenomenon he describes, of erosion when Fundamentalism is abandoned. I would cite the example of the World Council of Churches. It seems to me that we have emerging in the World Council a genuinely ecumenical theology that is *not* an eroded and anemic form of the Christian faith, but a theology by means of which all branches of Christendom are being forced to grapple rigorously and honestly with "the faith once delivered to the saints."

Having said all this, let me acknowledge with Mr. Meehl that I am distressed when I find, within Protestant bodies, patent departures from the New Testament *kerygma.* There are surely pulpits from which all the departures he mentions ("Pantheism, Humanism, Arianism, Unitarianism, Buddhism or plain Agnosticism") are proclaimed. But I still find it difficult to believe that these distortions can be traced to departure from Fundamentalism *per se,* and even more difficult to believe (as seems implied) that a return to Fundamentalism would rescue us from these ills. ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN

THE SCREEN

Had a Wife

BE SURE you're feeling strong when you go to see "Seance on a Wet Afternoon." And I urge you to go. This English film, concerned with a kidnapping along with other things, is the year's scariest. But it is much more than that with its fascinating story of a husband-and-wife situation played to perfection by Richard Attenborough and Kim Stanley, and with its delving into a psychological occult theme that is made doubly spooky by its setting in a Victorian Charles Addams house in a London suburb.

As the medium who conducts the seances in this eerie atmosphere, Kim Stanley gives a first-rate portrait of a weirdie who somehow manages to repel and attract her viewers. Richard Attenborough portrays her henpecked husband as an astounded and repelled Macbeth who carefully follows the plans for kidnapping a little girl, plans which the wife diabolically insists were suggested by their own dead son. It would be unfair to tell what happens in this unusual picture, but even if the characters, performances and plot were not so absorbing, "Seance" would be outstanding for its excellent cinema.

The script, written by Bryan Forbes from the novel by Mark McShane, is literate and has been enhanced by Forbes' excellent direction throughout. Also considerably aided by stark black-and-white photography and nerve-tingling music and sounds, "Seance" combines a curious mixture of realism and vague unearthliness. Even before the titles, the shots of the gloomy house on a wet afternoon and then its interior with a ring of people holding hands in a candle-lit room arouse the viewer, who is thereafter sent through scene after scene of off-beat dialogue and frightening story. Perhaps the most exciting of the many tense sequences comes when the husband goes to pick up the ransom money and, at the same time, a suspicious police inspector is being conducted through the house by the wife. The scheme for getting the money through a series of flights in London subways and stations is alone thrilling enough, but to add to the fast pace, the camera cuts back and forth from the subways to the medium and policemen in the house.

Besides the brilliant performances by Kim Stanley and Richard Attenborough, the supporting cast is also unusually good (or perhaps not unusual for a British film in which small roles are often well played). Outstanding in the large cast are Judith Donner as the very appealing kidnapped girl, Mark Eden and Nanette Newman as her distraught parents who behave with remarkable sanity. Sanity, however, is not the strong point of the medium, and when she realizes that the little girl, whom she always refers to as being "borrowed" not "kidnapped," has finally seen her kidnapper face to face and could identify him, she decides that her dead son would like the little girl to join him. In many other hands this role of the medium would become silly, but Miss Stanley makes it so real it is believable, and I hope her performance is remembered come next Oscar time. You aren't likely to forget it. My only real objection to "Seance on a Wet Afternoon" is that it never allows us to relax; there is no comedy relief; nor is there any time or situation for it. Ready or not, you have been chilled so often during the course of this two-hour movie that the last seance makes your blood run cold.

ANOTHER performance well worth your seeing is given by Anne Bancroft in another English film, "The

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Pumpkin Eater." This movie, also about an erratic wife, is, however, quite a different dish of tea. Its story is mainly about a woman whose chief interest in life is in having children. By the time she marries her third husband (Peter Finch), she has quite a flock of kids, quite attractive ones too, roaming around the house. This new husband doesn't seem to mind—until he becomes successful as a writer and too busy for his ever-loving, nagging wife who begins to look around for other men. But when an operation makes her sterile, she flips her lid—I think.

This story, based on Penelope Mortimer's novel, may be interesting enough; but the screenplay, as written by Harold Pinter, is so obscure, and the film's direction by Jack Clayton goes so far out of its way to be arty, that one is never quite sure what all this is getting at. Arty it is, with handsome photography and a fine cast that includes James Mason as a middle-aged fool with whose wife the heroine's husband is playing around. The moral seems to be: put up with your husband no matter how he philanders. What the moral doesn't say is what the husband should do about a wacky wife, even one as skillfully acted by Anne Bancroft. Perhaps put her in a pumpkin shell.

PHILIP T. HARTUNG

BOOKS

In Herblock, the World Is Almost Exclusively Political

Straight Herblock. By Herbert Block. Simon and Schuster. $5.95.

by Frank Getlein

IT HAS BECOME a misleading convention to refer to Herblock as the American Daumier. He isn't and nobody is either. One reason is that he and other American political cartoonists labor under the burden of freedom from government interference. Daumier, who served time for his impudence, on other occasions responded to the threat of jail by turning his attention to those segments of society that didn't have jails as their ultimate form of art criticism.

The result is that today, paging through Delteil's immense compilation of Daumier's cartoons, you get some approximation of the life beat of 19th-century Paris. There are fads and fashions, intellectual pretensions of all kinds, art exhibitions, swindles, new products, new transport, new family relationships and old ones as well. In Herblock, as in Mauldin and Conrad and Crockett, the world is almost exclusively political. Which, come to think of it, is one of the main things wrong with politics.

Another difference about Daumier was that, as the career progressed, he said more and more with pure line. He really was a graphic artist of social and political comment, which none of our men is, Conrad coming closest. Robert Osborn, the passionate sociologist and master of line, is our nearest to Daumier precisely because he is intensely interested in linear expression and in the texture of our life, as contrasted with the turns of our politics. But, to their mutual loss, Osborn does not work for a daily paper.

If comparisons must be made, it would be much more accurate to call Herblock the American George Bernard Shaw. Both minds are toweringly intellectual and both are concerned with the application of the most obvious kind of common sense to political situations. In GBS and in Herblock the introduction of common sense immediately reveals paradox, irony, absurdity: high intellectual comedy. Also, both men have felt limited by the forms in which they worked. They had, and have, more to say than will fit into the evening in the theater or the daily cartoon. Hence the Prefaces. Hence the text of *Straight Herblock*, which is only very rarely a commentary on any of the actual 456 cartoons of the last five years or so, here reproduced.

Instead, the text is an all-but-independent commentary on two dozen subjects ranging from the long Southern-primitive dominance of Congress through gerontocratic control of key committees, to the nuclear threat, to the witch doctors of the AMA, to the extortionists of the parochial school lobby who have successfully prevented Federal aid to public education. The stress is domestic rather than foreign and one particularly lovely passage is on "Goldwaterland," Herblock's own Disneyland.

Now that the Goldwater menace has been deflated to its true size, it is devoutly to be hoped that some of this penetrating attention will be turned to the actual holders of power in Washington, certainly a proper target. With the advent of Senator Goldwater as announced candidate, an amazing number of liberal commentators and newspapers suddenly discovered that Lyndon Johnson was the philosopher-king. These organs and observers not only should have



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known better; four years earlier they did know better. Herblock did not fall into that mindless Hosannah-shouting, but he was certainly so fascinated by Goldwater as not to notice slips by the Democratic leadership.

Two examples. Senator Fulbright figures in the book as a minor heroic oracle urging the country to "think the unthinkable" about changing relationships with the Soviet Union. Not too long after that, the Senator voted against Civil Rights and against cloture of debate, i. e. against allowing the Senate even to vote on Civil Rights. Now there is an obvious point here about thinkable thoughts for liberal Southerners, but it went right over Herblock's head.

Second, the Johnson money. Herblock discusses the "corruption" issue as if unscrupulous and sensation-seeking reporters were trying to pin Bobby Baker's bonanzas on his boss; but again he obscures the point. In a series of cartoons devoted to Baker, and in the text as well, there is no hint that Baker and Johnson were ever connected at all; Baker appears as an independent force who somehow became secretary to the Senate Majority at the time that Johnson was Majority Leader.

But the real point about the Johnson money was not the town house for the secretary's secretary, not the hi-fi set to the president, not the vending franchises for the Senate's vendor, but the Johnson money itself. An awful lot of it, several million by any estimate, came directly from television monopolies handed to the Johnson family by the F. C. C. during Johnson's years of Senatorial power.

There is nothing illegal about this procedure. It is the classic method of American political rags-to-riches adventures, beginning with the county board of supervisors laying out a highway. This is why perhaps the majority of men go into politics, and this is how they get paid: a process efficient, immensely lucrative and a little shabby. And in Herblock's survey of Washington foibles, it never happened.

The temptation here is a kind of intellectual partnership. Fulbright is an extremely important agent of intelligence in Congressional thought on foreign policy: therefore it serves no useful purpose to note that on Civil Rights he is one with the Old Slaveowners' bloc in the Senate. Goldwater as President really is unthinkable: therefore the sources of Johnson's income are quite irrelevant. Both instances are omissions. Much more important are the things that do fall within survey. The now classic cartoon of Goldwater upbraiding the destitute mother and her children, "If you had any initiative, you'd go out and inherit a department store," outlives Goldwater as a political force, because the attitude tagged is all too prevalent among the rich and lucky, including rich and lucky Senators.

The same is true of his whorehouse scene of the General Electric price-fixers and their playmates; of his juxtaposition of Latin desperation poverty and Latin wild affluence; and especially and all the time of his steady drumming on the relation between Congressional private interests and Congressional inactivity. For it is probably in the under-

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standing of how Congress actually works, or fails to work, that Herblock has made his most important contribution to popular political education. His theory of liberal government is sound; his heart is compassionate; more important still is the grasp and clarification of how the fix is put on in Congress.

In this he more nearly resembles Daumier than Shaw, but when you get right down to it, Herblock is the American Herblock and we are blessed in having him.

Business and Its Practitioners

The Business Establishment. Edited by Earl F. Cheit. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. $4.95.

by John P. Sisk

The Business Establishment is a collection made up of six long papers presented early this year at a University of California at Berkeley workshop, the aim of which was to bring the "humanities, politics, and history to bear on the establishment of business and its practitioners." The visiting professors were left completely free in the handling of assigned subjects but were commonly agreed about "the importance of preserving the connection between the intellectual adventure and the business adventure." The promise of intellectual adventure is fully realized.

Robert L. Heilbroner begins by examining the changed and changing business ideology of the 1960's. Specifically, he examines a series of lectures delivered by top corporation executives at the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University. He notes the new tone of pragmatism and careful deliberation among these speakers, their emphasis on professional responsibility and human values, and their recognition of the legitimate roles of labor and government. His assessment of these lectures is complex: on the one hand they are clearly pep-talks, on the other they represent a real advance over the conventional wisdom still operative at lower levels in the business world. What the new business ideology lacks, even at its most sophisticated, is a grandiose image of society, a projection of human possibilities cast in a larger mold than is offered by today's institutions."

Why the ideology lacks that grandiose image is substantially explained by John William Ward in the following essay on individualism and organization. Professor Ward's forty-page treatment of the history and consequences of individualism in American life is a model of concision, organization and tact. In American history, he points out, we must take into account two very different meanings of individualism—the first, heroic, atomistic, suspicious of the claims of society; the second, cooperative, recognizing the individual's need of society to become truly an individual. In proportion as they are unaware of these opposed meanings, Americans trying to understand themselves in business or political contexts are subjected to disjunctive agonies. "Our choice," says Professor Ward, "is not between organization and something else" but between organizations that serve our needs and ideals and [those] that do not."

In "The Search for a Capitalist Hero," Henry Nash Smith brings his immense knowledge of American fiction to bear on the sad fate of the businessman in the novel. His purpose is not so much to prove that the businessman has fared badly in imaginative literature as to demonstrate it. He surveys the relevant literature from Mark Twain to Ayn Rand, and shows that even popular novelists with the best will in the world (Cameron Hawley or Ayn Rand, for instance) "cannot sustain a character of real imaginative substance" while "serious writers seem unable to take an interest in a system of values based on economic assumptions."

Richard Hofstadter's essay on the paradoxical fortunes of the anti-trust movement is a good example of how the separate sections of the book, each of which could stand nicely

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
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

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alone, gain in resonance from their location in the whole. In this instance, the proximity of Professor Ward's essay on individualism gives Professor Hofstadter's essay a dimension it did not have when it appeared earlier, and in shorter form, in *Commentary* magazine.

Professor Earl F. Cheit, who is both editor and contributor, sets out to answer the question why managers have abandoned the free-enterprise campaign of the early 1950's and are now cultivating social responsibility. He observes the shift with shrewd reservations: the primary concern of the corporation, after all, is autonomy. Nevertheless, a complex of pressures (labor, government, public opinion) have not only made necessary a new rhetoric but "may provide the basis for more flexible use of private enterprise in our mixed economy."

Finally, Paul A. Samuelson explores with great subtlety the correlation between personal freedoms and economic freedoms and comes to conclusions that will give little comfort to those whose indiscriminate piety leads them to see the welfare state as a preparation for Communism and slavery.

The striking thing about these essays is the extent to which, in spite of the individual freedom of treatment, they end up reinforcing each other. The whole effort reflects great credit on Professor Cheit and his contributors. In one of two brief summarizing statements by foreign observers, Professor Philippe De Woot of the University of Louvain confesses that "we Europeans feel so much younger and less experienced than you." I suspect that he is not simply being polite, but that he had in fact listened with some awe while "the soul-searching and very distinguished American professors" asked themselves and their students that most American of questions: Who they are and where they are going.

REVIEWERS

Frank Getlein, art critic for the *New Republic*, is the author of *The Trouble with Catholics* (Helicon).

John P. Sisk teaches at Gonzaga University, Spokane.

The Church in a crucial area



Timely, authoritative, urgently important, this collection of essays is a full-scale study of the relationship of the Church to social change in Latin America. Outstanding Churchmen and political and social scientists from Latin America and the United States explore the decision the Church now faces: whether to preserve its traditional alliance with the upper classes or offer the masses more vigorous leadership than has been possible under the old paternalism.

The contributors include EDUARDO FREI, President of Chile; MARK G. McGRATH, C.S.C., Auxiliary Bishop of Panama; and ROGER E. VEKEMANS, S. J. This is a book that no one interested in the Church's future in this hemisphere can afford to overlook.

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